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ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS. By Sotirios
Barber.1 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1984.
Pp. viii, 245.
Stanley C Brubaker2

Of the recent books developing general theories of the Constitution or the role of the courts in constitutional adjudication,
this work is the most ambitious.3 Before considering the legitimacy of "noninterpretive" judicial review or the tension between
judicial review and democracy-the questions that have absorbed
most constitutional commentators-we must ask the question
posed by Barber, "What does the Constitution mean?'' In exploring this qustion, Barber takes the perspective of an ideal citizen.
He thus avoids the typical lawyer's confusion of constitutional law
with the Constitution itself, as well as the typical social scientist's
conceit that we can know all the constitutional facts but nothing
about constitutional values. In this work, Barber takes constitutional interpretation to uncharted depths of meaning where it
must penetrate some of the toughest and most enduring questions
of political authority. That Barber's reach should exceed his grasp
can hardly be surprising, but the flaws of his argument appear
deep, stemming both from the basic logic of this argument and the
fabric from which he fashions the Constitution's meaning and
authority.
I

Barber's argument is sufficiently complex that it must be outlined in some detail. The first two chapters rebut the objection
that the Constitution has no meaning (dealing with the contention
that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, and the
"realist" claim that the disposition of the justices, not the Constitution itself, determines what the Court says).4 Professor Barber
then begins the construction of his argument in chapter three. Its
keystone is an account of article VI, where the Constitution proI.

2.
3.
4.

Visiting Professor of Political Science, Princeton, University.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University.
S. BARBER ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984).
/d. at 5, 16.
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claims itself the "supreme law of the land." "Meaning" for Barber is primarily a matter of "making sense,"5 and making sense
requires conforming to the structure of reason and to fundamental
concepts. Thus, since law is in part a command one cannot coherently command someone to do contradictory things; if the Constitution is law, all aspects of it must have singular and
noncontradictory meanings. And since means are subordinate to
ends, if we establish an aspect of the Constitution as a mere
means, it must be subordinate to whatever end it serves.
These basic points present a problem for "making sense" of
the supremacy clause. The preamble of the Constitution seems to
cast justice, domestic tranquility, the common welfare, etc., as the
ends for which the Constitution itself becomes a mere set of
means. But given the varying circumstances the nation must face
in pursuing these ends, the Constitution's means must sometimes
be imperfect. And if means are subordinate to ends, the means of
the Constitution, by the Constitution's own terms, cannot reasonably claim to be the "supreme law of the land." Thus either the
supremacy clause is not to be taken seriously, for its terms are
contradicted by the apparent relation of the Constitution to its
preamble, or alternatively, the relation must be one other than
that of means to ends. Pursuing the latter view, the Constitution
could be considered the concrete embodiment of the preamble's
abstract ideals and thus an end in itself, that is, "the good society,
or the best society of which we are capable."6 But this solution
presents difficulties of its own, for it arrogantly assumes complete
knowledge of what is good society, an assumption belied by the
presence of article V's amending provision. So, having shown that
the Constitution is neither a body of pure means nor an absolute
end, Professor Barber sets forth the following as the basic logic of
the Constitution's claim to authority:
Major Premise: We the people want justice, the general welfare, domestic tranquility, the common defense-in brief, the ingredients of the good society.
Minor Premise: The ways of the Constitution constitute our
best current conception of the good society-<>ur best understanding for now.
Conclusion: We therefore accept this Constitution--that is,
we accept it as supreme law.
Viewing the Constitution through this logic and as an end in
5.
39-62.
6.

Trying to Make Sense of the Supremacy Clause, as he titles chapter three. /d. at
!d. at 56.
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itself brings a couple of twists in conventional constitutional interpretation. First, practices usually considered of instrumental
value take on intrinsic worth. "Exercising the powers of government and honoring constitutional rights can be valued as ends in
themselves for the same reason that self-restraint, moderation,
and autonomy are looked upon as virtues and objects of praise
independently of their success as means to other desiderata." 7
Second, doubts about the Constitution's authority are actually
preconditions to reaffirming the Constitution as law. That is, he
maintains, we do not experience the Constitution as law unless we
have some inclination to disobey it (since law presupposes an inclination towards disobedience). Similarly, we cannot accept the
claim to supremacy unless we reason that the Constitution is our
best current conception of the good society, reasoning that must
consider the possibility that the Constitution won't measure up. A
Constitution blindly obeyed is a Constitution unaffirmed.s
Professor Barber calls this approach to the Constitution "aspirational."9 Concerning any provision of the Constitution, the
interpreter must ask what is "the best reason" for the adoption of
the provision "in the first place."to Thus while the framers' basic
"concept" remains authoritative, the meaning of a provision does
not have to conform to the specific "conceptions" or intentions
that they had in mind.' 1 And our understanding of the Constitution can evolve as we develop better reasons for constitutional
provisions. On the other hand, the Constitution's language and
tradition prevent it from becoming just anything, even if the
meanings we wish to attach would make it a superior document.
For such changes there is the amendment process. Thus the Constitution is neither wholly closed nor wholly open to "ideas of independent content and worth, like simple justice." Towards these,
"the Constitution is and must be partially open."12
In the light cast by this analysis Professor Barber then attempts to "make sense" of the Constitution's three major aspects:
constitutional powers, rights, and institutions. The enumeration
of powers in the Constitution, he argues, shows both that there are
"tasks to be performed" by the national government and, conversely, that there are "some things that the national government
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
BARBER,
12.

ld at 55-57.
See id at 35, 50, 57, 114.
ld at 10.
ld at 76.
In this Barber follows R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLy 134 ( 1977). S.
supra note 3, at 39-40, 117.
ld at 11-12. See also id at 59.
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[is] not to do."n Examining the "best reasons" for granting the
enumerated powers, Professor Barber gives them an expansive
reading, unqualified by any concern for the claims of states rights
(whose bona fides he doubts), and reaffirming Justice Stone's characterization of the tenth amendment as "a truism."t4 Yet, according to Barber, there can be no praise or honor for acting upon
reasons "that only the states, if anyone, can lawfully invoke." If,
in enacting a law, Congress harbors an unavowed "primary purpose" that only a state can claim while invoking one of its enumerated powers as a mere pretext, it violates the Constitution.ts
Just as chapter four emphasizes "the negative implication of
the enumeration of powers," chapter five emphasizes "the affirmative, forward-looking implication of the Constitution's enumerated rights."t6 Respecting rights is not a matter of simple
inaction. Instead, "honoring constitutional rights" should be our
"highest political value."t7 Holding that a true right must be a
genuine "trump," a true "exemption from power" and hence an
"absolute," Professor Barber maintains that, "we cannot have a
constitutional reason for violating a constitutional right no matter
what the sacr!fices."ts To those who say that absolutism renders
the Constitution a suicide pact, Barber replies that dishonoring
rights is itself a form of suicide, constituting as it does an essential
change of the polity's character. And if our choice is defeat
through revolution, coup d'etat, or war while honoring rights, versus a dishonorable victory, Professor Barber views defeat, from a
constitutional perspective, as the more laudable.
On the actual content of these rights, Professor Barber understandably provides only sketches. He does indicate that the first
amendment prohibits all prior restraint "no matter what judges
may think about the threat of irreparable harm" and "regardless
of the cost." He argues for the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states and contends that this application derives neither from
the words nor the intentions of the framers of the fourteenth
Id at 64.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
15. Jd at 91. Barber's reliance on "primary purpose" affronts democratic authority.
For example, as an exercise of the commerce power, he argues, the Civil Rights Act of 1964
should be declared void. Id at 91-102. As everyone knows, its primary purpose was not
the promotion of commerce, but the safeguarding of civil rights. But if the effect of discrimination on the flow of interstate commerce is substantial, as seems to be the case, that
should be sufficient reason for upholding the Civil Rights Act. Barber's contrary position
implies the anomaly that if Congress did indeed honor civil rights less than a can of beans,
the statute would be constitutional.
16. Id at 108.
17. Jd at 105.
18. Jd at 140 (emphasis added).
13.
14.
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amendment, but rather from the logic of a document that places
highest political value on honoring rights.t9 "Due process" rights
he also regards as absolutes, as "real exceptions to what government can do in pursuit of its ends." Professor Barber's understanding of due process goes beyond core "fair trial" conceptions
and has substantive implications: due process of law exists only
when there are constitutionally defensible reasons for the action"a reason, that is, to believe that what [the government] is doing
serves the common good."2o Thus he criticizes the abstention of
the contemporary Court from questions of economic liberty and
defends its protection of personal liberty, including Roe v. Wade.
Against the woman's liberty to procure an abortion through the
second trimester, government can assert no constitutionally defensible reason for interference. The primary motivation behind
anti-abortion legislation, he maintains, is religious in character;
other arguments are mere pretexts. Echoing his earlier argument
regarding the unlawfulness of pretext, and viewing as most unlikely plausible nonreligious opposition to abortion, he concludes
that "for a long time to come, as far as I can see, the right to
abortion will, or certainly should, appear to be a constitutional
right."21
19. /d. at 151, 153, 155. To contend, as did Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore, that the Constitution's history, language, and structure firmly establish that the Bill
of Rights applies only to the federal government is to engage, according to Professor Barber, in bad logic. "If constitutional rights can trump the powers of the national government, and if national policies can defeat state policies, it seems anomalous," he reasons, "to
conclude that state policies can defeat constitutional rights." /d. at 155. But Barber's "refutation" has logical problems of its own, as we see when we take his argument to its implied next step: "If constitutional rights can trump the powers of state governments, and if
state policies can defeat an individual's policies, it would seem anomalous to conclude that
the individual's policies can defeat constitutional rights." That is, constitutional limits
would have to be extended to the private sphere, so that an individual could be held to
answer in coun for alleged discrimination on the basis of race in his or her personal decisions--who to marry, who to invite to dinner-<Jr for giving money to a religious establishment. In shon, Barber begs the question of the relation of the Bill of Rights to the states by
assuming that a right against one pany is a right against all. But of course not all rights if
any have this universal character. The Bill of Rights thus can quite sensibly be understood,
as Marshall stated, as "limitations on power . . . applicable to the government created by
the instrument," Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 ( 1833).
20. S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 126, 128.
21. /d. at 140. Like his argument against the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (as an exercise of the commerce power), see note 19 supra, his argument against
abonion legislation affronts democratic authority. Assuming arguendo his constitutional
premise, that reasons with religious roots count for nothing, it does not follow that their
presence, even if assumed to constitute the primary reason, must fatally infect sufficient
explanations that are not religiously based. And that sufficient explanations exist, is hard
to deny. Since few wish to prohibit timely abonion of a pregnancy resulting from rape or
incest, yet these offences are regarded by most as lesser crimes than murder, the slogan
"abonion is murder" no doubt overstates the real sentiment of the nonreligious opposition.
But on the other hand, few people, even among the most ardent advocates of the freedom
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Turning to constitutional institutions, Professor Barber argues that "the Constitution makes no real sense from a checks and
balances perspective."22 Checks and balances cast the Constitution as mere means, a structuring of ambition against ambition to
prevent usurpation of power; it prevents us from seeing the separation of powers as an end in itself, "the institutional embodiment
of a national aspiration to rise above accident and force by governing ourselves by the claims of reason. "23
Two more implications for constitutional institutions follow
from his attempt to make sense of the Constitution. One is that
the provisions of the Constitution cannot bend to prevent conflict
amongst themselves or to accommodate pressing circumstances.
The other concerns the role of the courts. That the Constitution
itself cannot meet all circumstances or survive all emergencies, he
maintains, follows from the basic concept of the Constitution as
law and its claim to supremacy. To be supreme on its own terms,
the Constitution depends on a reasoned affirmation; but affirmation, to be reasonable, must include the possibility of rejection.
"To believe in advance that the Constitution can be anything it
has to be," he argues, "is to eliminate the possibility of rejecting
it."24 That is, to preclude rejection is to preclude reasoned affirmation, which in tum is to preclude the possibility of a sensible
claim to be the supreme law of the land. Thus, the possibility of
emergencies or circumstances that make it impossible or senseless
to follow the Constitution is necessary if we are to regard the Constitution as supreme law. And, although the Constitution always
binds officeholders and citizens to its provisions, this does not
mean (paradoxically) that they should always follow the Constitution. As Professor Barber understands the Constitution, it "presupposes more or less ideal circumstances,"2s and therefore actual
circumstances may bring its provisions into conflict or render
some provisions impossible to honor. When one who occupies office faces such circumstances, he acts no longer as the officeholder
(because one who holds office must honor all duties of that office),
to abort, regard abortion as just another form of contraception; and virtually no one could
view without moral nausea the decision to abort in the sixth month of pregnancy for a
frivolous reason-say to fit into a dress for a special dan;;e. Lying somewhere between
contraception and infanticide, abortion can with good secular reason be considered wrong.
How wrong and whether this wrong balances the hardship imposed by an unw~ted pregnancy presents tough questions on which reasonable people can differ-and which consequently should be resolved by the legislature.
22. /d at 185.
23. Id at 180.
24. Id at 191.
25. /d at 189.

1985]

BOOK REVIEW

267

but as one "strategically positioned" to do what he thinks best for
the country.26
On the role of the courts, Professor Barber develops three
points. First, while courts have the authority and duty to exercise
judicial review, they do not have exclusive authority to interpret
the Constitution. Though the Constitution does have "one meaning," this "does not imply one interpreter."27 Within his range of
authority, every office holder must abide by his own interpretation
of the Constitution. Second, while Congress, in accord with the
Constitution can (indeed, should) refuse to cooperate with judicial
decisions it thinks unconstitutional, it cannot define the constitutional rights to be followed by the courts nor can it limit the remedial authority or the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In fact,
declaring the "exceptions" clause a constitutional "superfluity,"
Professor Barber contends that jurisdiction of the federal courts
must be coextensive with federal authority.2s Third, the judiciary
should not "defer" to other branches or exercise "judicial self-restraint." Neither the argument from democratic authority nor the
argument from limited judicial capacity can authorize judges to
do anything other than act upon their own best conception of
what the Constitution means.
II

The basic logic of Barber's Constitution is this: "We want
. the good society. The ways of the Constitution constitute our
best current conception of the good society. We therefore accept
this Constitution ... as supreme law."29 In this brief syllogism
there are troubling ambiguities and apparent contradictions. The
syllogism implies that "the good" is superior to "the just" as the
basis of political authority. Suggesting the superiority of Platonic
and Aristotelean over Kantian philosophy, this proposition may
well be correct, but more than an assertion is necessary to establish its truth. And even if he had developed the argument to sustain this proposition, it seems inconsistent with other parts of his
theory. For example, in his insistence that the Constitution re26. I d. at 189-90, 20 I.
27. Id. at 197.
28. I d. at 209. The Constitution, as Barber understands it, has a surprising number of
nullities and superfluities. In addition to the exceptions clause (art. III, sec. 2, cl. 2), there
are the fugitive slave clause (prior to the passage of the thirteenth amendment) (art. IV, sec.
2, cl. 3), the tenth amendment, the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (art. I,
sec. 9, cl. 2), and, as a means of applying the Bill of Rights to the states, the privileges and
immunities and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. S. BARBER, supra note
3, at 200, 70, 193-96, and 154-59.
29. Id. at 55-57.

268

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:261

quires inflexible adherence to fixed conceptions of rights and authority, even if such adherence causes the destruction of the polity,
Barber implies a morality of conviction rather than the morality
of consequences more often associated with the idea of the good.
One must wonder, too, about Barber's "typical citizen," who
virtuously pursues the basic logic of the Constitution's claim to
supremacy. This citizen must experience temptation to disobey
the Constitution, for only this temptation, Barber maintains, stimulates the intellect to inquire if the current conception of the Constitution is the best conception. If this temptation is truly
necessary, however, this citizen's intellect would seem subservient
to his nonintellectual passions.Jo But Barber says his typical citizen is "governed by an attitude that places the highest social or
political value on the activity of reasoning about how one ought to
live."3 1
Professor Barber says, "we the people," "our best conception," and "we therefore accept." Seemingly, he refers to the collective views of all United States citizens. But if he does, his logic
approaches the tautological or its development is radically incomplete. Assuming he wishes his minor premise32 to be taken as a
statement of fact or a condition of authority rather than a mere
hypothetical in a logic puzzle, then how do we know that the people regard the Constitution as their best current conception of the
good society? If it is by the fact of ratification, then the statement
is tautological: the Constitution is our best conception because
(and only because) we have ratified it. Once ratified, the Constitution can never be disjoined from our best current conception.
Even amendments become part of our best conception only at the
instant of their ratification and not a moment before. To avoid
this tautology, Professor Barber might have tried to develop some
way by which one could understand a collective judgment on such
matters. For example, he could have explicated Justice Cardozo's
richly suggestive reference to the judgments "of men and women
who the social mind would rank as intelligent and virtuous."J3 Or
30. Id at 120. Even to posit temptation or disinclination as an aspect of virtue appears curious. To become virtuous one must initially repress temptation, but at least according to an Aristotelean understanding of virtue, the passions and desires of the truly
virtuous man (sophron) have become so controlled and properly habituated that he no
longer experiences them as temptation. What Barber describes as a virtuous ?lan seems
closer to what Aristotle regarded as a distinct and less noble species of the adm1rable souL
the morally strong man (enkrates). This person indeed does experience powerful temptations, but is strong enough to resist them.
31. /d. at vii (emphasis added).
32. /d. at 57.
33. B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF THE LEGAL SCIENCE 37 (1928).
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he could have explored the work of the second Justice Harlan or
Alexander Bickel or the many others who have offered plausible
ways of understanding collective rather than merely personal
judgments.
From the text, it is impossible to say whether Professor Barber considered these possibilities and then rejected them; but after
his statement of the basic logic of the supremacy clause, all his
arguments refer to the individual's best conception of the Constitution. Since Barber maintains that our best current conception of
the Constitution will surely fall short of the ultimate criteria of
true meaning (the best reasons for adopting it in the first place), it
seems far from obvious why an individual should prefer his own
imperfect conception over the collective imperfect conception.
Assuming, as both the oath of office and Professor Barber's notion
of political responsibility require, that legislators do strive to follow the Constitution, then laws embody a collective conception
(though perhaps not the best collective conception) of the Constitution, one implying that the enacted law conforms to it.
What problems for democratic authority are then presented
by officeholders and citizens who still insist, as Barber's Constitution requires, upon basing their conduct only on their own best
conception of the Constitution? For example, Professor Barber
argues that "the judiciary has no constitutional warrant for deferring to any branch." Admitting that judges should be skeptical of
their own answers, he maintains that ')udges should be at least
equally skeptical about the constitutionalism of others, since all
are equally subjects of the Constitution as law." He continues:
"It is therefore difficult to see how constitutional judges can follow
anything less than their best conceptions of what the Constitution
requires-in defiance of the other branches of government and
public opinion, if need be."J4 The rhetorical device that lends
credence to this statement is the phrase "anything less than their
best." Of course no one wants any inferior conception to become
authoritative, but why accept anything less than the best congressional conception of the Constitution? When the legislators' best
conception of the Constitution is incompatible with that of the judiciary, though the judiciary admits that the legislators' conception is a reasonable one--one that just might be right and their
own conception wrong-why should the judiciary's opinion prevail over the legislators? If this is the proper way to frame the
question, it is hard to resist the general force of James Bradley
Thayer's answer: only when the court believes the legislature has
34.

S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 218-19; see also id at 165.
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made a clear mistake, should it declare the law void.3s
Apart from the concern of democratic authority is the question of order. What would be the practical consequence of Barber's insistence that each citizen and every officeholder has a
constitutional obligation to follow only his or her best understanding of the Constitution?36 While he is quite correct that the Court
should have no monopoly on determining the meaning of the
Constitution, this individualist approach threatens a paralyzing
disorder. Consider one scenario: Congress passes a bill conforming to its members' best conception of the Constitution. The
president on the basis of his best conception thinks the bill unlawful and vetoes it. Reaffirming its initial judgment, Congress passes
it over his veto by the necessary two-thirds majority. The president then refuses to enforce it. But the attorney general believes,
according to his own best conception, that the bill does have the
status of law, and he proceeds to enforce it against the express
demand of the president. One solution would be for the president
to dismiss the attorney general, giving the executive the last word
on constitutional issues. Or perhaps the president would not dismiss the attorney general, and the law would be enforced through
a court that agrees with the congressional best conception and accordingly convicts and sentences a defendant. Yet the warden to
whose prison the convict has been sentenced agrees with the presidential interpretation and refuses to lock the prisoner in his cell.
The prisoner is recaptured and sentenced to another prison, but
this prison's warden disagrees with the court on an evidentiary
question, and following his best conception of due process, sets the
prisoner free again. The permutations of Professor Barber's logic
are endless, yet the consequence is clear-imbalance or disorder
bordering on anarchy.
III
If Professor Barber's Constitution cannot govern in normal
times, it might seem superfluous to ask how it can govern in times
of crises, but its inadequacy here derives from a different source,
so that even if the former problem were corrected the latter would
remain. This source might be called its fabric of construction.
Barber is persuasive, even eloquent in developing his proposition that viewing constitutional problems with a commitment to
35. Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Judicial Review, 7 HARV. L.
REv. 129-55 (1893). I develop this argument for judicial restraint in greater detail in Reconsidering Dworkin's Case for Judicial Activism, 46 JOURNAL oF Pouncs 503-19 (1984).
36. S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 198.
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a constitutionally ideal state of affairs gives constitutional theory a
coherence it cannot otherwise achieve, yet he goes on to understand the Constitution not simply "in light of' its aspirations, but
to be those aspirations; when these cannot be achieved, the Constitution is no longer in effect. Recall that for Barber, the Constitution presupposes more or less ideal circumstances. When
officeholders cannot enforce these provisions, they are no longer
officeholders but people "strategically positioned"37 to exercise
power, people who are no longer obliged by its provisions, but
released to exercise "whatever prudential devices they can get
away with in an effort to restore conditions requisite to following
the Constitution, !(that is the end they seek."3s On the other hand,
when it is conceivably possible to comply with a provision of the
Constitution within one's range of authority, one is constitutionally obliged to do so regardless of the consequences, even if that
includes the political death of the nation.39
In these assertions-that the Constitution's obligations bind
one regardless of the consequences and that necessity liberates one
from the Constitution's obligations-Professor Barber reveals that
curious combination of idealism and cynicism that often results
from a refusal to recognize the Constitution as part of the political
universe and to see politics as the art of the possible. Although he
frequently quotes Abraham Lincoln, Professor Barber refuses to
acknowledge what Alexander Bickel called "the Lincolnian tension,"40 the tension between principle and expediency within
which all decent governments must reside. Professor Barber is
surely correct in saying we should understand the Constitution in
light of its aspirations. But despite his protestations to the contrary,4I his is a utopian document if it does not contain mechanisms for mediating the tension between these aspirations and
brute facts.
In melding idealism with cynicism, Barber has constructed
his constitution from a brittle fabric; it absolutely resists counter37. /d. at 189.
38. Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
39. Thus Professor Barber argues that a "constitutional judiciary," id. at 199, should
have realized from the start that the fugitive slave clause and any other constitutional recognition of slavery were "constitutional contradictions" or "mistakes," and should have refused to give effect to any law attempting to enforce these provisions. Concerning the
Constitution's aspirations, Professor Barber is no doubt correct, but the action he advocates-which would have its analogue in the spheres of authority of all other constitutional
officeholders and citizens-would surely have precipitated an early secession of the southem states that would have doomed the union.
40. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 56-72 (1962).
41. S. BARBER, JUpra note 3, at 62, 114.
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vailing pressure-up to a point-then it simply snaps. This point
is illustrated well by his treatment of constitutional rights. All
true rights, he tells us, are trumps, genuine exemptions from
power; whatever they protect, they protect absolutely. The Constitution cannot even contemplate a right in conflict with another
constitutional right or power. And if honoring a right requires
suicide, better death than dishonor.
We can agree that the Constitution must mandate noncontradictory actions (and incidentally that some dishonors are worse
than death), but his characterization of rights is only one of three
courses to reach this conclusion. One course is to give the rights
such a narrow reading that they could never conflict and it would
always be possible to honor them. Although the Constitution
would then always govern, such narrow rights would not meet
Professor Barber's aspirational ideal. So Barber gives generous
content to constitutional rights, but recognizing that they cannot
always be honored, holds that the Constitution does not always
govern.
Between these choices--generous rights in a Constitution that
governs only in ideal circumstances and niggardly rights in a Constitution that governs always-there is of course a sensible middle
course. It is possible to say that a person has a right of some definite, but not absolute strength. When the force of a justification
falls short of the strength of the right, the right is protected; when
the force of the government's justification exceeds the strength of
the right, governmental authority will prevail. If one is addicted
to the language of absolutes, one can say that a citizen has an
absolute right to have his right counted at its full strength, not an
absolute right to prevail. Or alternatively, if the language of rights
if restricted to outcomes, that a citizen has claims that must be
absolutely recognized for their full worth but no absolute rights.
When an officeholder makes a good faith assessment of the
competing claims of governmental authority and individual
rights, he does no "dishonor" to the right if he decides that the
government's is stronger. Indeed where the governmental claim is
clearly stronger than an individual's right, an officeholder who
"honored" the individual claim would be more deserving of ridicule or anger rather than admiration. Some rights (e.g., the right
to a fair trial), are so strong that they are virtually absolute. For
the health of the body politic, perhaps courts should call them absolute,42 since the circumstances in which governmental authority
42. C. Black, Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights,
Feb. 1961, at 3.

HARPER'S,
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could outweigh them would likely be so extraordinary that courts
could not even operate. In contrast, the right to advocate imminent lawless action seems appropriately outweighed, as it is in
contemporary judicial doctrine, when the advocacy "is likely to
incite or produce such action."43 Even the weighty right to be free
of state-imposed segregation could be counterbalanced by the
need to quell a prison race riot-if indeed, following contemporary court doctrine, the means were truly necessary to effect the
clearly compelling end.
Barber does not directly criticize this prudent middle course,
seemingly because his idealism prevents him from seeing it. For
him, a Constitution able to handle all contingencies, fit to meet
"the various crises of human affairs,"44 would be a document of
infinite flexibility, thus of infinite meaning, therefore devoid of
meaning. "[A] plastic constitution cannot be a real constitution."4s Upon this understanding of what a constitution must be,
Professor Barber expresses what would otherwise seem a perverse
sense of vindication in noting constitutional failures; to him failures are necessary to affirm the Constitution's meaning.46
But Barber confuses a flexible Constitution with a fluid one.
The fluid Constitution is his plastic Constitution. Like Heraclitus's river it is always in flux, once one thing, now another, soon to
be yet another. A flexible Constitution, on the contrary, is constant in meaning but its meaning allows for adaptation to changing circumstances. It establishes ideals, but does not require ideal
conditions for the exercise of its authority. Even in the worst of
emergencies when its literal terms must be violated to allow its
spirit to prevail, its authority remains a gravitational force, guiding the emergency powers back to the norm as circumstances permit. It does not tum officeholders loose in difficult times to do
whatever they think is right, at liberty to return to constitutional
norms "if that is the end they seek."47
Barber's excessive idealism, and hence the brittleness of his
Constitution, derives not simply from an absolutist concept of
rights. Nor does it rest in fatuous sentimentality-indeed, if anything, Barber is exceptionally rigorous in pursuing the logic of his
argument even if this places him occasionally in the camp of his
adversaries. Rather, its deep source is the tragically flawed desire
to unite the concerns of philosophy and politics. Barber describes
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819).
S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 191.
/d. at 50, 60, 151, and 191.
/d. at 201.
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the highest value of his ideal citizen both as the distinctively political value, "honor," and the distinctively philosophical value,
"reason." He wishes love of truth to be identical to the love of
country. His book is written from the perspective of a citizen, but
that citizen must be a philosopher. Barber's citizens are to be
taught that "favoritism of anything other than the truth [is] immoral" and that they must hold "truth above all other values."4s
Can the Constitution truly share so singularly the philosopher's end of truth? Perhaps it would be possible for politics to
hold truth and its pursuit above all other values, (politics concerned only disembodied souls. But politics generally, and especially the politics of liberal democracies, is concerned as well with
the needs and desires of the body; and consequently politics must
be concerned not simply with the hierarchy of ends but also with
their urgency. Thus even if we hold with Barber that truth should
be the highest pursuit of man, a polity must sometimes yield instead to demands for privacy and physical security and wellbeing.
For Barber, the Constitution's authority depends on its fidelity to the standard of truth. Under his basic logic, one can affirm
the Constitution's claim to authority only following a critical and
reasoned assessment that the Constitution matches one's best conception of the best society; as one's knowledge grows, one must
continually subject the Constitution to this test to affirm its
supremacy.49 Given Barber's unyielding philosophical standard,
affirmation would seem a rare event; nothing less than the best
merits allegiance. Deeply concerned with the conditions of this
affirmation, Barber curiously neglects the consequences of rejection. One of these consequences, of course, is that with no affirmation of the Constitution, obedience to laws passed under its
authority becomes a matter of expediency rather than general obligation. It is most unlikely that in such conditions one could
comfortably contemplate "how one ought to live."so In short, if
the life of the mind is to prevail or even survive, it cannot reign
sublimely oblivious to politics. The true philosopher should thus
affirm the general authority of the decent regime that assists, with48. Id at 162-63. His position on prior restraint follows logically from this; as long as
it is plausible that one publishes for the purpose of "influencing public policy . . . there can
be no constitutional prior restraint, no matter what judges may think about the threat of
irreparable harm." Id at 151. Barber confesses that his position will render the Constitution a suicide-pact; but this, he indicates, is nonetheless the requirement of a document
resting its authority on the independent affirmation of citizens who examine all relevant
knowledge. ld at 151.
49. ld at 160.
50. ld at vii.
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out completing, his development and tolerates, without necessarily
following, his teaching.
Inappropriate for politics, inexpedient as a measure of obligation, the singular concern of the philosopher as the end of constitutional authority is in a very basic sense unnatural. Consider his
attempt to remold the concept of "Founding Fathers." The ideal
or true father, he indicates, is the one "who knows what is best."si
The meaning of this idea of fatherhood, which superficially hints
of paternalism, Barber unfolds with relished irony as teaching that
children must think for themselves--otherwise they will not know
who their "true" father is. In seeking guidance, children should
regard their natural parents indifferently among the millions from
whom advice might be obtained; each potential "father" will be
judged according to the child's capacity to decide who truly knows
best. As her own thinking changes, the child will become attached
first to one person then to another. Similarly, by implication, the
true Founding Fathers are not those responsible for writing the
Constitution, but the great teachers of mandkind: Moses, Plato,
Aristotle, Christ, Hobbes, as well as those whose relation to the
actual founders is remote, such as Confucious, Buddha, and
Mohammed.s2
In retaliation for teaching exactly this sort of subversive distance from one's own father and fatherland, the Socrates of Aristophanes' Clouds was made to suffer the burning of his home by
an enraged parent and on such a charge the real Socrates was
made to drink the hemlock. For one as well educated in classical
philosophy as Professor Barber, it is curious that he appears to
take Plato's reply to these charges in the Republic as earnest rather
than ironic:s3 recall that as a condition to the Republics perfect
union of philosophy and politics, parents (who do not share the
philosopher's passion for wisdom) must force the philosophers
(who would rather reason rather than rule) to become kings and
then abandon to them their children, land, and country. TheRepublic thus defends the enterprise of philosophy by portraying its
perfect regime of philosopher Kings with supreme Socratic irony,
51. /d. at 119.
52. Or perhaps Mick Jaggor and Michael Jackson, since the individual decides for
himself who is a great thinker. It should be emphasized that the question here is not
whether the Constitution should be interpreted in light of the teachings of the compassionate Buddha; Barber is clear that towards such teachings the Constitution can at most be
only marginally open. Rather the question for one embracing Buddhism is whether in
light of its teaching the authority of the Constitution can be affirmed as the best embodiment of a Buddhist society. (Indeed, it is far from clear that many Christians could give a
similar affirmation.)
53. See, e.g., id. at 135-37.
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by showing the very impossibility of a perfect regime, philosophy
demonstrates the defensibility of imperfect but decent regimes.
Barber seems oddly to take this ironic defense of philosophy,
the construction of a deliberately unnatural and impossible regime, as his standard of evaluation and of allegiance. In doing so
his argument corrupts the spheres of both politics and philosophy.
As Aristophanes correctly taught, perfect indifference to one's
own family and fatherland in the name of impartial and perfect
justice destroys the loyalty that makes civilized life and pro tanto
actual justice possible. By the same token, in pretending that the
pursuit of truth heedless of personal interest-the extraordinarily
rare and precious gift for philosophy--<::an be the common lot of
typical citizens, Barber debases its high and noble character, a
character that presupposes and yet transcends politics.
These are serious criticisms, but then Barber has written an
eminently serious book, one that ties constitutional analysis to the
most basic questions of western civilization. If there are faults in
the analysis, as I maintain there are, one can still say that there is
sometimes more to learn from the errors of great efforts than from
the truths of petty ones.

